Post by KenNiemann on Apr 17, 2006 15:06:00 GMT -5
2006 CSUN
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the [url2006 CSUN
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge.
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page 2006 CSUN
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge.
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge:
2006 CSUN
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge.
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the [url2006 CSUN
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge.
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page 2006 CSUN
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge.
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge:
2006 CSUN
PHILOSOPHY Of BIOLOGY CONFERENCE
Saturday, May 6, 2006
Library Presentation Room
Oviatt Library Lower Level Room 81 (West Wing)
Program:
Opening Remarks: Dr. Elizabeth A. Say
Dean, College of Humanities, CSUN
10-11.15: Kyle Stanford (UC Irvine)
Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract
11.15-12.30: Jane Maienschein (Arizona State)
Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract
12.30-2.00: Lunch Break
2.00-3.15: Michael Ruse (Florida State)
Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract
3.15-4.00: Panel Discussion
4.15-5.15: Special Discusion Session for Students
Registration is free, but space is limited. Lunch will be provided by the conference. If you plan to have lunch, we ask you to register by email in advance. Please send your email to conference convener Bonnie Paller at bonnie.paller@csun.edu, stating "Attending Lunch", so that your name is on the lunch list. Please RSVP by May 1st, 2006.
Paper Abstracts and Suggested Readings:
Kyle Stanford: Realism in the Biological Sciences: Theories of Inheritance and Unconceived Alternatives
Abstract:
Traditionally, neither biologists nor philosophers of biology have concerned themselves overmuch with disputes about scientific realism. Perhaps this is because the usual grounds offered for doubts about the approximate truth of contemporary scientific theories consist almost exclusively of (1) the possibility of empirically equivalent alternatives to them and (2) the ultimate abandonment of earlier theories with impressive empirical successes to their credit: the distinctive challenges posed by such concerns for the theories of the physical sciences seem simply not to apply in the same way or with the same force to those of the biological sciences. But in earlier and forthcoming work (2001, 2006), I have argued that the most serious threat to scientific realism is instead posed by what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: our repeated failure to even conceive of serious alternatives to our best scientific theories that were nonetheless well-supported by the evidence available at the time. And in this talk I will argue that this problem applies as much to biology as to any other part of the sciences. I will use the history of our theorizing about questions of generation and inheritance as a case study, examining the seminal 19 th Century contributions of Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. Each of these theorists proposed a substantial and important account of inheritance and generation, but I offer evidence that each also failed even to conceive of an entire class of alternatives to his own account that was equally well-confirmed by the available evidence and that was sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced by later scientists and scientific communities. If I am right, the most serious ground for concern about the probable, approximate truth of our scientific theories is as pressing a concern for the contemporary biological sciences as for any others.
Suggested Readings:
Stanford, P. Kyle (2001). “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (Proceedings): S1-S12.
(forthcoming May 2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press.
(2005). “August Weismann’s Theory of the Germ-Plasm and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 27: 163-199.
(in press). “Francis Galton’s Stirp Theory of Inheritance and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, Biology and Philosophy.
(forthcoming). “Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Jane Maienschein: Embryos, Stem Cells, and Epistemology: how do we know what we know?
Abstract:
I will lay out what is at issue with current human embryonic stem cell research, place that in historical context, and explore questions about what methodological and epistemological assumptions have been made about development. How do we know what we think we know in embryology? How do we "see inside" the developing living organism, given that most methods for observation require killing the specimen? And how do we understand what might be possible with stem cell therapies today, given that what we study in the lab is cell plasticity and what we seek is developmental stability?
Suggested Readings:
Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells. Harvard University Press.
Scott Gilbert, et al., Bioethics and the New Embryology: Springboards for Debate. W.H. Freeman and Sinauer Associates
Ronald Greene, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy. Oxford University Press
Michael Ruse: Form and Function: Rival Paradigms?
Abstract:
What is form? What is function? Why have these questions plagued biologists since the time of Aristotle? Did Darwin's theory of evolution through natural selection decide matters definitively in the direction of function? if so, why is the new science of evolutionary development --evo devo- so keen on form? do we have paradigm differneces (in the sense of Thomas Kuhn) at work here? These are the questions that structure my talk.
Suggested Readings:
Michael Ruse: Darwin and Design : Does Evolution Have a Purpose? Harvard University Press. 2003.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at California State University Northridge.
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page
Campus Map
Directions to CSUN
Campus Information (818) 677-1200
2005 CSUN Philosophy of Biology Conference
Philosophy Department's Home Page