Post by KenNiemann on Mar 25, 2005 4:10:37 GMT -5
Dr Joe Strauss is an "Objective Straight Chiropractor" who holds to a metaphysical construct known as "innate intelligence". He postulates that when he straightens the spine via chiropractic adjustments, he optimizes the flow of this innate intelligence:
f-a-c-e.com/v3n2.htm
I fault Strauss and those like him, not for having religious beliefs but for employing the wrong methods to answer the subluxation question. He engages in deductive philosophical reflection and comes to a conclusion regarding a highly contingent state of affairs.
He employs philosophical reflection on a question that must be properly answered empirically.
In otherwords, the verity of subluxation theory cannot be arrived at deductively because there is no logical necessity of the IVF being to small to accommodate minor vertebral malpositions. For him to demonstrate subluxation theory deductively as he claims to do, he must show that the denial of subluxation theory involves some sort of logical contradiction. He simply cannot do this and the argument becomes inductive.
The Baysian Probability approach is a great example of what we call justification by positive evidence.
Here,
P(T/E) = [P(E/T) x P(T)]/ P(E)
Where:
P(T/E) = The posterior probability of T given evidence E. Or, the probability that theory T is true given the fact of evidence E
P(E/T)= the likelihood of E given T. If we accept T does that make E 100% likely? More probable? Plausible?
P(T) = The probability that T is true apart from E (i.e. the prior probability of T)
P(E) = The probability E will obtain apart from acceptance of T, called the expectedness of E
With all this we get Bayes theorem as:
The probability of T being true given evidence E is equal to the prior probability of T being true apart from evidence E obtaining, multiplied by the likelihood that E will occur given that T is true, divided by the prior probability that E is expected to occur without T being true.
If the probability that T is true given E is greater than the probability that T is true without E, that's P(T/E) >
P(T), then evidence E offers positive support for T.
Strauss has a problem in that whenever any sort of evidence is presented, it remains the case that
P(T)> P(T/E). No quality evidence makes his theory more probable but in fact decreases the probability.
Secondly, Strauss' theory succumbs to Ockham's Razor which informs us that we cannot have any extra parts to our theories. That is, if a given feature of a theory is not necessary, it must be jettisoned. But what does Strauss notion of Innate Intelligence force add to any explanation of a physiological nexus? Strauss'theory must always end in the material world. Otherwise, he has no claims to health whatsoever. This is downfall. He must arrive in the physical world at the end of his argument but his postulates are not necessary to explain anything. Outside mental events every physiological causal nexus in the body may be explained completely in the language of biology, chemistry and physics.
When natural law can explain a thing, it should explain that thing. Elsewise, what prevents one from postulating fairy and gnome interference in the nervous system?
I would argue that mental events are the exception to this rule because one cannot reason or have the real ability to choose if our minds are merely a system of physical causes and effects.
Strauss' camp seems to be Thomist substance dualists which view the soul as equally present in all areas of the body unlike a modified Cartesian understanding which merely associates the soul with higher brain functions out of the necessity to do so.
In my view, Strauss position lacks the epistemic virtue of using the best methods available to solve an ethical question.
f-a-c-e.com/v3n2.htm
I fault Strauss and those like him, not for having religious beliefs but for employing the wrong methods to answer the subluxation question. He engages in deductive philosophical reflection and comes to a conclusion regarding a highly contingent state of affairs.
He employs philosophical reflection on a question that must be properly answered empirically.
In otherwords, the verity of subluxation theory cannot be arrived at deductively because there is no logical necessity of the IVF being to small to accommodate minor vertebral malpositions. For him to demonstrate subluxation theory deductively as he claims to do, he must show that the denial of subluxation theory involves some sort of logical contradiction. He simply cannot do this and the argument becomes inductive.
The Baysian Probability approach is a great example of what we call justification by positive evidence.
Here,
P(T/E) = [P(E/T) x P(T)]/ P(E)
Where:
P(T/E) = The posterior probability of T given evidence E. Or, the probability that theory T is true given the fact of evidence E
P(E/T)= the likelihood of E given T. If we accept T does that make E 100% likely? More probable? Plausible?
P(T) = The probability that T is true apart from E (i.e. the prior probability of T)
P(E) = The probability E will obtain apart from acceptance of T, called the expectedness of E
With all this we get Bayes theorem as:
The probability of T being true given evidence E is equal to the prior probability of T being true apart from evidence E obtaining, multiplied by the likelihood that E will occur given that T is true, divided by the prior probability that E is expected to occur without T being true.
If the probability that T is true given E is greater than the probability that T is true without E, that's P(T/E) >
P(T), then evidence E offers positive support for T.
Strauss has a problem in that whenever any sort of evidence is presented, it remains the case that
P(T)> P(T/E). No quality evidence makes his theory more probable but in fact decreases the probability.
Secondly, Strauss' theory succumbs to Ockham's Razor which informs us that we cannot have any extra parts to our theories. That is, if a given feature of a theory is not necessary, it must be jettisoned. But what does Strauss notion of Innate Intelligence force add to any explanation of a physiological nexus? Strauss'theory must always end in the material world. Otherwise, he has no claims to health whatsoever. This is downfall. He must arrive in the physical world at the end of his argument but his postulates are not necessary to explain anything. Outside mental events every physiological causal nexus in the body may be explained completely in the language of biology, chemistry and physics.
When natural law can explain a thing, it should explain that thing. Elsewise, what prevents one from postulating fairy and gnome interference in the nervous system?
I would argue that mental events are the exception to this rule because one cannot reason or have the real ability to choose if our minds are merely a system of physical causes and effects.
Strauss' camp seems to be Thomist substance dualists which view the soul as equally present in all areas of the body unlike a modified Cartesian understanding which merely associates the soul with higher brain functions out of the necessity to do so.
In my view, Strauss position lacks the epistemic virtue of using the best methods available to solve an ethical question.