Post by KenNiemann on Mar 25, 2005 3:52:45 GMT -5
Philosopher of Science Karl Popper argued that the criterion of demarcation of empirical science from pseudo-science and metaphysics is falsifiability.
Peter Angeles defines "falsify" this way:
In science, to falsify is to show that the evidence in support of an empirical statement is not verified or confirmed by scientific methodology.
Generally speaking, we do have an ethical duty to falsify an empirical statement when we have the ability to do so. However, this does not mean we should embrace Popper as a model of scientific and epistemological thought.
For example, the Principle of Falsifiability itself is not falsifiable so Popper has a problem coming out of the gates. There is no empirical test one could do to falsify the Principle of Falsifiability. Why does he exempt this from his programme? How much of what Popper says in his writings is actually falsifiable itself while claiming to be scientific? It must be made clear here that Popper is not making a scientific statement, but a "meta" statement- a statement about science rather than within science.
Now one can argue that the Principle of Falsifiability is a First Principle ( something that must be assumed up front before anyting else can be known, i.e. logic) and I would probably agree. First Principles do not need to be proven. Morerover, if something can be falsified, I believe we have the intellectual and ethical burden to make the attempt.
However, I would also argue that not every scientific theory is falsifiable. String Theory and Darwinism would serve as counter examples to the understanding that everything scientific is falsifiable. As Darwinist Allen Orr points out, there's no gaurentee we can reconstruct the history of a biochemical pathway.
I think most things are falsifiable and the falsifiablity test is immensely helpful in determining whether something is true or not. But it's certainly not an absolute.
Most importantly, Popper, at the end of the day, is a relativist holding to Evolutionary Epistemology (how we know what we know). He holds to the idea that theories that are "fit" rather than objectively true.
But, in addition to the previously mentioned challenge of arriving at reason through a system of physical causes and effects, there is difficulty in accounting for how we can know things at all under Popper's view.
Generally, Popper follows Harvard's Quine: “Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.”
Or similarly:
1. If nature does not cause us to have mostly true beliefs, we will not survive.
2. We have survived natural selection.
3.Therefore, nature has caused us to have mostly true beliefs.
Seemingly, this is begging the question, but apart from that, the argument faces a number of criticisms. First, according to West Point philosopher Pojman (pronounced "Poyman), “Survival might have little to do with true beliefs but much to do with habits and behavior that have survival value. In fact, it could be that most of our beliefs are false, but adequate for survival.” (Pojman, What Can We Know?, 2001).
He gives an example of experiments which rats were given distinctively flavored food and water, after which (i.e. 12 hours) they were made sick through doses of radiation. After a single exposure, the rats developed an aversion to the food. This represents an innate yet false belief supposedly formed by natural selection. Many of us will attest to not eating foods after getting sick when in fact there is a false knowledge
present that it was the food, and not an isolated contamination of bacteria for example, that made us sick.
Further, Pojman adds that “What may be more important is whether a being errs in having false negatives rather than false positives. All things being equal, false negatives are more deleterious to survival than false postives…..If an animal, say an antelope, is supersensitive to predation, it may needlessly expend energy in reacting to [innocuous] rustling of the nearby bushes by fleeing the scene, but that is probably preferable to insensitivity to predation”.
Hence, a belief being true or false may have nothing to do with survivability. False beliefs may even encourage survival!
This was also of concern to Darwin himself: “With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the conviction’s of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the conviction of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”<br>
With regards to number 2), people can still “get along” in life while holding false beliefs.
The take home message here is to get people to reconsider making appeals to the works of Popper, at least in the cases cited above, beause he does believe theories are grounded in REAL reason. For Popper, they are grounded in survivability and this does not necessarily make them true.
Peter Angeles defines "falsify" this way:
In science, to falsify is to show that the evidence in support of an empirical statement is not verified or confirmed by scientific methodology.
Generally speaking, we do have an ethical duty to falsify an empirical statement when we have the ability to do so. However, this does not mean we should embrace Popper as a model of scientific and epistemological thought.
For example, the Principle of Falsifiability itself is not falsifiable so Popper has a problem coming out of the gates. There is no empirical test one could do to falsify the Principle of Falsifiability. Why does he exempt this from his programme? How much of what Popper says in his writings is actually falsifiable itself while claiming to be scientific? It must be made clear here that Popper is not making a scientific statement, but a "meta" statement- a statement about science rather than within science.
Now one can argue that the Principle of Falsifiability is a First Principle ( something that must be assumed up front before anyting else can be known, i.e. logic) and I would probably agree. First Principles do not need to be proven. Morerover, if something can be falsified, I believe we have the intellectual and ethical burden to make the attempt.
However, I would also argue that not every scientific theory is falsifiable. String Theory and Darwinism would serve as counter examples to the understanding that everything scientific is falsifiable. As Darwinist Allen Orr points out, there's no gaurentee we can reconstruct the history of a biochemical pathway.
I think most things are falsifiable and the falsifiablity test is immensely helpful in determining whether something is true or not. But it's certainly not an absolute.
Most importantly, Popper, at the end of the day, is a relativist holding to Evolutionary Epistemology (how we know what we know). He holds to the idea that theories that are "fit" rather than objectively true.
But, in addition to the previously mentioned challenge of arriving at reason through a system of physical causes and effects, there is difficulty in accounting for how we can know things at all under Popper's view.
Generally, Popper follows Harvard's Quine: “Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind.”
Or similarly:
1. If nature does not cause us to have mostly true beliefs, we will not survive.
2. We have survived natural selection.
3.Therefore, nature has caused us to have mostly true beliefs.
Seemingly, this is begging the question, but apart from that, the argument faces a number of criticisms. First, according to West Point philosopher Pojman (pronounced "Poyman), “Survival might have little to do with true beliefs but much to do with habits and behavior that have survival value. In fact, it could be that most of our beliefs are false, but adequate for survival.” (Pojman, What Can We Know?, 2001).
He gives an example of experiments which rats were given distinctively flavored food and water, after which (i.e. 12 hours) they were made sick through doses of radiation. After a single exposure, the rats developed an aversion to the food. This represents an innate yet false belief supposedly formed by natural selection. Many of us will attest to not eating foods after getting sick when in fact there is a false knowledge
present that it was the food, and not an isolated contamination of bacteria for example, that made us sick.
Further, Pojman adds that “What may be more important is whether a being errs in having false negatives rather than false positives. All things being equal, false negatives are more deleterious to survival than false postives…..If an animal, say an antelope, is supersensitive to predation, it may needlessly expend energy in reacting to [innocuous] rustling of the nearby bushes by fleeing the scene, but that is probably preferable to insensitivity to predation”.
Hence, a belief being true or false may have nothing to do with survivability. False beliefs may even encourage survival!
This was also of concern to Darwin himself: “With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the conviction’s of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the conviction of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”<br>
With regards to number 2), people can still “get along” in life while holding false beliefs.
The take home message here is to get people to reconsider making appeals to the works of Popper, at least in the cases cited above, beause he does believe theories are grounded in REAL reason. For Popper, they are grounded in survivability and this does not necessarily make them true.